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Abstract - This paper reviews the outcome of a state electoral reform initiative in

terms of the four-stage behavior change process used by social marketers to
gauge the effectiveness of their techniques. While the Clean Elections initiative
was moderately successful in its Action and Contemplation stages, the author
argues that realization of its full potential could be significantly hastened by
utilizing the social marketing tools of segmentation, communications research
and pretesting.
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Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers and/or Practitioners - While
the Clean Elections initiative was moderately successful in its Action and
Contemplation stages, the author argues that realization of its full potential
could be significantly hastened by utilizing the social marketing tools of
segmentation, communications research

Introduction
Marketing is about facilitating exchange between at least two parties, both of
whom must perceive that the benefits of participation outweigh the costs. In
commercial marketing, a successful exchange results in profit for the marketer.
In social marketing, success is defined in terms of measurable behavior change
that helps solve a social problem, improve a social condition, or otherwise aid
society at large.
New Jersey’s 2007 pilot program of public financing for legislative
campaigns, known as Clean Elections, can be viewed as a social marketing effort
that met with moderate success. But a number of challenges were exposed in the
course of the effort that help explain why efforts in 2009 to renew it were
unsuccessful. Analyzing these challenges from a social marketing perspective
may help advocates to overcome them, not only in relation to Clean Elections,
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but also in the interests of other ambitious and well-meaning social change
initiatives.

Background
To the extent that policy planners have heard of social marketing, it is
frequently understood as little more than public service advertising. This is not
surprising in view of early scholarship in the field, most of which characterized it
simply as a tool to promote and enhance the appeal of a social idea (Kotler and
Roberto1989).
But to equate social marketing with advertising alone is to both oversimplify
it, and to seriously underestimate its potential to achieve the more ambitious
goal of behavior change. Indeed, its strongest contemporary advocates take the
position that there is no social marketing success without action. A seminal
paper by Kotler and Zaltman (1979), generally credited with launching social
marketing as a distinct discipline, explicitly called for active implementation and
control of its programs in the marketplace. As defined by Andreasen 2002, 7):
“What makes social marketing potentially unique is that it (1) holds behavior
change as its ‘bottom line,’ (2) therefore is fanatically customer-driven, and (3)
emphasizes creating attractive exchanges that encourage behavior.”
Importantly, he and other contemporary scholars also stress that effective social
marketing focuses not only on the benefit side of the proposed exchange –
convincing the target audience that the transaction will improve their lives – but
also on minimizing its real or perceived costs.
As currently and comprehensively defined, a social marketing campaign
should encompass certain tactics and techniques that are common to commercial
marketing campaigns. These include doing consumer research and pretesting to
help develop communication materials; segmenting target audiences;
customizing the four P’s (product, price, promotion, place) as much as possible;
and attending to competing behaviors. Social marketing can also be
implemented simultaneously with other change strategies. For example, social
marketing can complement programs of structural change, which target laws
and institutions instead of (or in addition to) individuals. Its messages can be
effectively targeted not only to individuals or segments of citizens, but also to
policy makers and other stakeholders (Hastings et.al. 2000).
Both in planning the campaign and evaluating outcomes, it is helpful to
think of the behavior change sought in social marketing not as a single
occurrence but as a process. The four stages of this process include:
(1) Precontemplation – initial consideration of the behavior
(2) Contemplation – evaluation of the behavior
(3) Action – engaging in the behavior
(4) Maintenance – reinforcing and continuing the behavior
Cleaning Up Dirty Politics
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Clean Elections in New Jersey
In the last decade, New Jersey has been plagued by a wave of public corruption.
Some of the criminal behavior has been linked to the high cost of running for
office in the state; because of its location, New Jersey candidates are largely
dependent on the expensive New York and Philadelphia media markets. To raise
campaign cash, public officials have been caught engaging in thievery, bribery,
extortion and kickback schemes. Voter anger and disgust with the political
process have been manifested, in part, by electoral turnouts well below 40% in
legislative races.
On common practice is known as “pay to play.” It is technically legal though
generally perceived as unethical. Candidates take outsize campaign
contributions from companies and professionals who seek public contracts, then
deliver those contracts in a quid pro quo that is usually difficult to prove but
believed to exist at every level of government. Most experts agree that “pay to
play” ultimately burdens taxpayers with subpar, overly expensive public
services, an outcome dubbed New Jersey’s “corruption tax.”
Clean Elections, a program of public financing for legislative campaigns,
grew out of public clamor for an end to “pay to play.” The idea is that
participating candidates receive a fixed, predictable amount of money to run
their races, in return for rejecting all contributions from businesses or lobbyists
and any amount greater than $10 from individual donors.
Three other states have recently mounted legislative Clean Elections
programs: Arizona, Maine and Connecticut. Vermont has a program, but it is
limited to gubernatorial candidates. In 2012, New Mexico and North Carolina
offered public funding in campaigns for the judiciary and for certain statewide
offices (National Conference of State Legislatures 2012). While cross-state
comparisons are difficult because of wide variations in structure and funding,
New Jersey’s effort was, on most measures, the most complex and expensive at
the time (New Jersey Citizens Clean Elections Commission 2007; Levin 2006).
New Jersey’s first trial run of Clean Elections took place in 2005, in two
election districts. To qualify for public funding, candidates were required to
obtain 1500 contributions of either $5 or $30 in less than three months. There
were a myriad of restrictions on the collection process, plus a set of reporting and
disclosure rules so unwieldy that almost no one in the program could follow
them. In the absence of adequate publicity, voters were ill informed and
confused. In the end, only two of ten prospective candidates met the
requirements to participate, and the experiment was generally judged a failure.
A vastly simplified Clean Elections pilot was tried again in 2007, in three
districts. Candidates were required to obtain only 800 contributions, all in the
amount of $10. A $600,000 public education program was mounted. This time,
all nine prospective clean candidates qualified for the funding.
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Voter attitudes in the Clean Elections districts were assessed via a public
opinion poll, fielded by independent university pollsters during the two months
preceding the election. Results indicated that voters in these districts had higher
levels of awareness and information about the legislative campaigns than voters
elsewhere in the state. Additionally, they were more likely than other voters to
cite issues, rather than personalities, as the focus of the campaigns (Woolley and
Vercellotti 2007).

A Social Marketing Perspective on Clean Elections
From a social marketing perspective, the program’s goals were doubly
challenging. This is because its advocates sought not just one but two kinds of
behavior change.
(1) For the candidates to qualify for public funding, it was necessary for 800
voters in each candidate’s district to come forward with $10 donations.
(Traditional campaign fundraising relies on much larger donations from a
small pool of donors, many of whom live outside the candidate’s district.)
(2) For the program to show that it helped restore faith in the political
system, it was necessary – or at least highly desirable – for voter turnout
to improve in the clean districts, as compared to same-district turnouts in
comparable elections
On the first criterion, the 2007 program can be judged a success. All nine
prospective candidates were able to collect enough small donations to qualify.
But on the second criterion, the program fell short. As compared to 2003 (the
most recent comparable election, with no gubernatorial or federal candidates on
the ballot), turnout went up in one clean district, but either declined or stayed
the same in the other two clean districts. In one of the clean districts, turnout
fell below the 2007 average across all districts in the state.
With only fragmentary attitudinal and outcomes assessment – there were,
for example, no exit interviews with voters or longitudinal measures of attitude
change – it is difficult to analyze and compare the various influences on Clean
Elections. But it is possible to suggest at least a rough picture of what happened.
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Results: Implementation of Social Marketing Tactics and Techniques
In two ways, the 2007 Clean Elections pilot made effective use of social
marketing tactics and techniques.
First, the program effectively managed the 4 P’s to maximize the benefits
and minimize the costs of the desired behavior changes among voters.
 Product: Publicly funded legislative campaigns were associated with a
bundle of benefits compelling to a corruption-weary electorate. These
included more honesty in politics and government; less tax money
siphoned off by public corruption; and more power vested in the individual
voter to influence an election and be taken seriously by candidates.
 Price: The costs of participation were minimized. Donations to the
candidates were capped at $10. Paperwork was greatly simplified as
compared to the 2005 pilot.
 Promotion: Promotional materials included direct mail; print, radio,
television and internet banner ads; and a new “Clean Candidate” ballot
designation for participants – arguably, a form of distinctive, attentiongetting packaging.
 Place: Virtually no effort was necessary to learn about or contact the clean
campaigns, as information was mailed to registered voters, posted on a
state government website, reported in local news media and publicized by
all nine participating candidates.
Second, attention was paid to competing behaviors. The target audience was
reminded, often and in multiple venues, that public nonparticipation would
mean a continuation of “dirty politics” as usual. More specifically, Clean
Elections was consistently described as a pilot program which would not be
repeated if it failed to show promising results.
However, some fundamental social marketing tools were not used. There
was no effort to segment target audiences; to use consumer research in the
development of communication materials; or to conduct any form of either
pretesting or post-testing.

Discussion: Issues and Outcomes by Stages of the
Behavior Change Process
Precontemplation: An inherent weakness at this early stage was the fact that
the 2007 clean districts were different from the 2005 clean districts. Had they
been the same, there might have been some carryover in awareness and
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comprehension of at least the goals of the program. Instead, advocates were
starting from scratch in their efforts to encourage initial consideration.
Contemplation: Evaluation was facilitated by a public education effort far
more extensive than in 2005. There were advertisements, direct mail to voters,
and in-depth website information, designed and managed by the New Jersey
Election Law Enforcement Commission. In addition, because nine candidates
qualified for the funding – and did so early in the election season – these
candidates themselves generated much publicity and offered many opportunities
for people to ask questions about Clean Elections. However, in the absence of
any communications research, it is impossible to gauge whether the materials
were maximally effective -- and if not, whether the shortcomings were in
comprehension, retention, believability or overall message strategy.
The failure to segment target audiences was a still more fundamental
stumbling block. This is for a reason obvious to marketers but not necessarily
clear to government agencies: some voters are likely to be significantly more
aware of and interested in political reform than others. Even among those who
are aware, many citizens may be too cynical to believe that Clean Elections can
make a difference. There is little point in one-size-fits-all promotional materials
that will motivate a few voter segments but be dismissed or ignored by others.
Had an effort been made to identify the most receptive audience, it may have
been more cost-effective and productive to target extra mailings and other
communications to that smaller group than to spread the available promotional
resources thinly across the entire universe of registered voters.
Action(s): Regarding Action #1, enough $10 donors came forward for all the
prospective candidates to qualify. This was a critical improvement over 2005,
when such action was seriously hampered by its costs: specifically, the difficulty
of obtaining forms and deciphering the rules for participation. In 2007, these
costs were minimized with downloadable, shorter forms and other
simplifications. For example, while the 2005 program allowed donations of either
$5 or $30 and required personal bank checks, 2007 donations were solely in the
amount of $10 and could be paid in cash or by credit card. Regarding Action #2,
voter turnout in the clean districts did not markedly improve. In social
marketing terms, this suggests that few people (relative to the total population
of registered voters) perceived a greater benefit or increased efficacy in going to
the polls in a clean election than in a traditional election. It is reasonable to
conjecture that all voters in the clean districts felt better about participating
than they might otherwise have felt, but there is no data to quantify such an
effect.
Maintenance: Reinforcement and continuation of Clean Elections is
dependent on future structural change by the New Jersey Legislature. But
public enthusiasm – or lack thereof – is one factor that can sway legislative
decision-making.
Cleaning Up Dirty Politics
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Implications for Social Marketing
While social marketing approaches have spread to a wide range of government
agencies and non-for-profit organizations (Andreasen 2002), the Clean Elections
experience suggests that policy planners on the state level still have limited
understanding of its principles and potential. There is appreciation of the need
to translate program characteristics into consumer/voter benefits, and to reduce
the costs/inconveniences of participation. But the absence of communications
research or audience segmentation may impede behavior change on a broader
scale. As noted by Hornik (2002), this is not a new problem; in the public health
field, a wide range of social marketing campaigns have fallen short because of
insufficient attention to implementational detail. The challenge for social
marketers: to make explicit and compelling for non-marketers the connection
between analysis and action.
On the positive side, the experience shows that it is possible to induce
significant progress in one stage of the behavior change process even while
falling short or encountering unforeseen obstacles in another. On one Action
measure – participation of $10 donors – there was clear success in 2007
compared to 2005. During the Contemplation stage, too, polling evidence of
heightened awareness among voters indicates that the 2007 public education
materials and message had some effect, however imperfectly that effectiveness
was tracked.
More broadly, the failure of Clean Elections to boost electoral turnout should
remind social marketers in all spheres that, as pointed out by (Rothschild 1999,
28), “Free choice, apathy and inertia are powerful competitive forces that often
are ignored…For every choice there is an alternative. In a free-choice society,
many laws are not followed if the target cannot discern the reward in doing so.”
Even when laws, education and marketing are jointly and deliberately brought
to bear on the high-profile problem of political corruption, there is no guarantee
the public will be easily or rapidly motivated to switch its longtime “brand” of
behavior.

Recommendations and Conclusion
Reviewing Clean Elections in terms of stages of behavior change suggests that
desired outcomes – heightened voter turnout, restoration of faith in the political
process – could be hastened by bolstering the program during Contemplation
and Maintenance. In a period of fiscal crisis and state budgetary cutbacks, it is
unrealistic for advocates to expect the New Jersey legislature to immediately
reauthorize Clean Elections; in particular, there is little chance that allocations
to the program would be increased solely for marketing purposes. In the future,
however, when the program expands across the state, some promotional funds
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may become available from clean candidates who collect more than the required
800 small donations and are willing to turn those funds back to the program.
To enhance the number of people who contemplate participation in Clean
Elections – as donors, voters, or both – segmentation research could be designed
to identify voter subgroups most responsive to electoral reform. Promotional
messages could then be pretested to determine how the benefits of Clean
Elections are perceived by those segments most likely to act on the messages.
In a social marketing analysis of disaster preparedness and lessons learned
from Hurricane Katrina (Guion et.al.2007, 7), the authors note: “Successful
marketing communications campaigns emphasize the importance of frequency in
creating knowledge. Thus, attention should be paid to programmatic
dissemination of messages and the identification of opportunities for reminders.”
This point is equally relevant to Clean Elections. Instead of waiting until a few
months before any given election to promote the program’s benefits and urge
participation, reminder messages and educational materials could be bundled
with other government communications and made available year-round in
libraries and state offices. They may also be disseminated by such independent
advocates as the League of Women Voters, Citizen Action and Public Interest
Research Group.
Maintenance of Clean Elections is largely a function of legislative decisionmaking, but social marketing techniques can help to build relationships between
program proponents and legislators. Indeed, some social marketing scholars
explicitly cite relationship-building as a legitimate goal and a form of behavior
change in itself (Hastings, forthcoming). Moreover, the clean candidates elected
in 2007 can present themselves and their legislative records, both to their
colleagues and to the public, as tangible “products” of the program. To the extent
they are perceived as effective champions of the cause of ethics reform, an
argument can reasonably be made that in the long term, Clean Elections has
real potential to improve government as well as politics.
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